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ABSTRACT 
A  Generalized  Temporal  Role  Based  Access  Control  (GTRBAC) 
model  that  captures  an  exhaustive  set  of  temporal  constraint  needs 
for  access  control  has  recently  been  proposed.  GTRBAC’s 
language  constructs  allow  one  to  specify  various  temporal 
constraints  on  role,  user-role  assignments  and  role-permission 
assignments.  In  this  paper,  we  identify  various  time-constrained 
cardinality,  control  flow  dependency  and  separation  of  duty 
constraints  (SoDs).  Such  constraints  allow  specification  of 
dynamically  changing  access  control  requirements  that  are  typical 
in  today’s  large  systems.  In  addition  to  allowing  specification  of 
time,  the  constraints  introduced  here  also  allow  expressing  access 
control  policies  at  a  finer  granularity.  The  inclusion  of  control 
flow  dependency  constraints  allows  defining  much  stricter 
dependency  requirements  that  are  typical  in  workflow  types  of 
applications.   
Categories  and  Subject  Descriptors 
D.4.6  [Security  and  Protection]:  Access  control;  H.2.7 
[Database  Administration]  Security,  integrity,  and  protection. 
General  Terms 
Security,  Theory. 
Keywords 
Role  based  access  control,  security,  separation  of  duty,  temporal 
constraints,  cardinality  constraint 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Role  based  access  control  (RBAC)  has  emerged  as  a  promising 
alternative  to  traditional  discretionary  and  mandatory  access 
control  (DAC  and  MAC)  models  [7,  11,  15,  16],  which  have  some 
inherent  limitations  [11].  Several  key  features  such  as  policy 
neutrality,  support  for  least  privilege,  efficient  access  control 
management,  are  associated  with  RBAC  models  [7,  11,  16].  Such 
features  make  RBAC  better  suited  for  handling  access  control 
requirements  of  diverse  organizations.  Furthermore,  the  concept 
of  role  is  associated  with  the  notion  of  functional  roles  in  an 
organization,  and  hence  RBAC  models  provide  intuitive  support 
for  expressing  organizational  access  control  policies  [5].  RBAC 
models  have  also  been  found  suitable  for  addressing  security 
issues  in  the  Internet  environment  [2,  11],  and  have  shown 
prospects  for  supporting  secure  interoperation  in  a  heterogeneous 
multidomain  environment  [10].   
One  of  the  important  aspects  of  access  control  is  that  of  time 
constraining  accesses  to  limit  resource  use.  Such  constraints  are 
essential  for  controlling  time-sensitive  activities  that  may  be 
present  in  various  applications  such  as  workflow  management 
systems  (WFMSs).  Tasks  in  a  WFMS  may  be  time  dependent  and 
need  to  be  executed  in  some  order  [3].  To  address  general  time-
based  access  control  needs,  Bertino  et  al.  propose  a  Temporal 
RBAC  model  (TRBAC)  [4],  which  has  been  recently  generalized 
by  Joshi  et  al.  [12].  The  Generalized-TRBAC  (GTRBAC)  model 
[12]  incorporates  a  set  of  language  constructs  for  the  specification 
of  various  temporal  constraints  on  roles,  including  constraints  on 
their  activations  as  well  as  on  their  enabling  times,  user-role 
assignment  and  role-permission  assignment.  In  particular, 
GTRBAC  makes  a  clear  distinction  between  role  enabling  and 
role  activation.  A  role  is  enabled  if  a  user  can  acquire  the 
permissions  assigned  to  it.  An  enabled  role  becomes  active  when 
a  user  acquires  the  permissions  assigned  to  it  in  a  session.  An 
open  issue  in  the  GTRBAC  model,  as  well  as  in  the  TRBAC 
model  [4]  is  the  specification  and  enforcement  of  time-
constrained  cardinality,  control  flow  dependency  and  separation 
of  duty  (SoD)  constraints. 
Cardinality  and  SoD  constraints  are  crucial  for  securing  many 
applications  in  a  commercial  environment.  Many  researchers  have 
highlighted  the  importance  and  use  of  cardinality  and  SoD 
constraints  in  RBAC  models  [8,  17,  18].  However,  no  one  has 
addressed  the  time-based  cardinality  and  SoD  constraints.  Use  of 
a  particular  constraint  for  a  period  of  time  or  duration  is  important 
for  emerging  applications  as  access  requirements  frequently 
change  with  time.  Dependency  constraints  are  relevant  to  role 
based  systems  as  roles  often  embody  organizational  functions  that 
may  be  inter-dependent.  For  instance,  a  doctor  in  training  may  be 
allowed  to  work  only  if  some  senior  doctor  who  can  supervise 
him,  is  also  on  duty.  Some  aspect  of  dependency  constraints  such 
as  history  based  access  control,  operational  SoD,  etc.,  have  been 
mentioned  in  general  access  control  literature  [3,  18],  but  they 
have  not  been  adequately  addressed  for  general  RBAC  systems.  In 
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this  paper,  we  focus  on  these  constraints  within  the  GTRBAC 
modeling  framework  [12].  The  key  contributions  of  this  paper  are 
as  follows: 
-  We  introduce  a  generic  framework  for  expressing  a  wide 
range  of  time-based  cardinality  constraints  with  the  help  of 
GTRBAC  status  predicates,  a  function  to  evaluate  these 
predicates  and  a  projection  operator  that  extracts  a  set  of 
elements  from  the  evaluation  of  the  function.   
-  We  develop  an  elaborate  trigger  expression  that  can  capture 
complex  dependencies  among  events  and  conditions.  In 
particular,  we  define  CFD  constraints  that  can  be  used  to 
express  stricter  control  flow  dependencies.  Furthermore,  we 
show  that  the  trigger  framework  and  the  CFD  constraint 
expressions  can  be  easily  extended  to  provide  an  elaborate 
time  based  RBAC  model  for  context-based  access  control. 
-  We  identify  a  large  set  of  possible  SoD  constraints  using  the 
GTRBAC  status  predicates.  These  SoDs  subsumes  the  SoDs 
that  have  been  identified  in  the  RBAC  literature,  and  at  the 
same  time  provide  much  finer  modeling  capability.   
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  two,  we  briefly 
present  the  constraints  of  GTRBAC.  In  section  three,  we  present 
the  status  predicates  for  a  GTRBAC  system  and  the  cardinality 
constraints.  In  section  4,  we  present  the  GTRBAC  triggers  and  the 
control  flow  dependency  constraints.  The  time-constrained  SoD 
constraints  are  presented  next,  in  section  5.  The  related  work  is 
presented  in  section  6.  Section  7  concludes  the  paper  and  provides 
some  future  directions. 
2.  THE  GTRBAC  MODEL 
The  GTRBAC  model  provides  a  temporal  framework  for 
specifying  an  extensive  set  of  temporal  constraints  [12].  This 
model  is  an  extension  of  the  TRBAC  model  [4]  and  uses  a 
language-based  framework.  GTRBAC  allows  various  types  of 
temporal  constraints  such  as  temporal  constraints  on  role 
enabling/disabling,  temporal  constraints  on  user-role  and  role-
permission  assignments/de-assignments,  role  activation-time 
constraints,  etc.  GTRBAC’s  administrative  run-time  events  allow 
an  administrator  to  dynamically  initiate  events.  Another  set  of 
run-time  events  allows  users  to  make  activation  requests  to  the 
system.  Furthermore,  constraint-enabling  expressions  include 
events  that  enable  or  disable  duration  constraints  and  role 
activation  constraints.  The  GTRBAC  triggers  allow  the 
expression  of  dependencies  among  GTRBAC  events,  and 
capturing  past  events.  GTRBAC  can  capture  the  dynamically 
changing  access  control  needs  of  a  system  [12,  13].  The  periodic 
expressions  are  written  as  (I,  P),  where  I  is  an  interval  and  P  is  a 
set  of  infinite  number  of  intervals.  (I,  P)  represents  the  set  of  all 
the  intervals  of  P  that  are  contained  in  I.  For  example,  (I,  P)  = 
([1/1/2002,  12/31/2002],  Mondays)  considers  all  the  Mondays  of 
the  year  2002.  D  is  used  to  express  the  duration  specified  for  a 
duration  constraint.  Temporal  constraints  are  expressed  by  a 
generic  form,  (I,  P,  E),  where  (I,  P)  is  the  periodic  expression,  or  a 
duration  constraint  c  =  ([I,  P|  D],  Dx,  E),  where  Dx  specifies  the 
duration  in  which  the  event  E  is  valid,  and  D  or  (I,  P)  specifies  the 
duration/interval  in  which  the  duration  constraint  c  is  valid.  The 
periodic  expressions  (I,  P)  used  in  the  constraint  expressions  are 
based  on  those  in  [4].  For  more  details,  we  refer  the  readers  to 
[12,  13].  An  example  of  a  GTRBAC  policy  for  a  medical 
information  system  is  illustrated  below. 
Example:  Table  1  contains  the  GTRBAC  policy  for  a  hospital. 
The  periodicity  constraint  1a  specifies  the  enabling  times  of 
DayDoctor  and  NightDoctor  roles.  For  simplicity,  we  use 
DayTime  and  NightTime  instead  of  their  (I,  P)  forms.  The 
periodicity  constraint  1b  allows  the  DayDoctor  role  to  be 
assigned  to  Adams  on  Mondays,  Wednesdays  and  Fridays,  and 
to  Bill  on  Tuesdays,  Thursdays,  Saturdays  and  Sundays. 
Similarly,  Alice  and  Ben  are  assigned  to  the  NightDoctor  role 
on  the  different  days  of  the  week.  Furthermore,  the  assignment 
in  1c  allows  Carol  to  assume  the  DayDoctor  role  everyday 
between  10am  and  3pm.  In  2a,  Ami  and  Elizabeth  are  assigned 
to  roles  NurseInTraining  and  DayNurse  respectively  with  no 
temporal  restriction,  i.e.,  the  assignment  is  valid  at  all  times.  2b 
specifies  a  duration  constraint  of  2  hours  on  the  enabling  time 
of  the  NurseInTraining  role,  but  this  constraint  is  valid  for 
only  6  hours  after  the  constraint  c1  has  been  enabled.  Because 
of  this,  Ami  will  be  able  to  activate  the  NurseInTraining  role  at 
the  most  for  two  hours  whenever  the  role  is  enabled.    In  row  3, 
we  have  a  set  of  triggers.  Trigger  3a  indicates  that  constraint  c1 
is  enabled  when  the  DayNurse  is  enabled,  which  means,  now, 
the  NurseInTraining  role  can  be  enabled  within  the  next  6 
hours.  Trigger  3b  indicates  that  10  min  after  Elizabeth  activates 
the  DayNurse  role,  the  NurseInTraining  role  is  enabled  for  a 
period  of  2  hours.  This  shows  that  a  nurse  in  training  will  have 
access  to  the  system  only  if  Elizabeth  is  present  in  the  system, 
that  is,  she  may  be  acting  as  a  training  supervisor.  It  is  possible 
that  Elizabeth  activates  the  DayNurse  role  a  number  of  times 
in  6  hours  after  the  DayNurse  role  has  been  enabled,  and  each 
time  the  NurseInTraining  role  will  also  be  enabled  if  these 
activations  (by  Elizabeth)  are  more  than  2  hours  apart.  This  will 
allow  Ami  to  activate  the  NurseInTraining  role  a  number  of 
times.  The  remaining  triggers  in  3  show  that  the  DayNurse  and 
NightNurse  roles  are  enabled  (disabled)  10  min  after  the 
DayDoctor  and  NightDoctor  roles  are  enabled  (disabled). 
Table  1:    Example  GTRBAC  access  control  policy  for  a 
medical  information  System 
 
a.  (DayTime,  enable  DayDoctor),  (NightTime,  enable 
NightDoctor) 
b.  ((M,  W,  F),  assignU  Adams  to  DayDoctor),  ((T,  Th,  S,  Su), 
assignU  Bill  to  DayDoctor); 
((M,  W,  F),  assignU  Alice  to  NightDoctor),  ((T,  Th,  S,  Su), 
assignU  Ben  to  NightDoctor) 
1 
c.  ([10am,  3pm],  assignU  Carol  to  DayDoctor) 
a.  (assignU  Ami  to  NurseInTraining);  (assignU  Elizabeth  to 
DayNurse) 
2 
b.  c1  =  (6  hours,  2  hours,  enable  NurseInTraining) 
a.  (enable  DayNurse  ®  enable  c1)   
b.  (activate  DayNurse  for  Elizabeth  ®  enable 
NurseInTraining  after  10  min) 
c.  (enable  NightDoctor  ®enable  NightNurse  after  10  min); 
3 
d.  (enable  DayDoctor  ®    enable  DayNurse  after  10  min); 
(disable  DayDoctor  ®    disable  DayNurse  after  10  min)        
3.  STATUS  EXPRESSIONS  AND 
CARDINALITY  CONSTRIANTS   
Table  1  lists  various  GTRBAC  status  predicates.  The  predicate  set 
extends  the  set  of  status  predicates  defined  in  our  previous  work 
[13].  Such  an  extension  was  needed  in  order  to  provide  a  finer 
modeling  capability  required  to  represent  various  temporal 
constraints  that  have  been  introduced  in  this  paper.  The  non-
temporal  counterparts  of  each  predicate  can  be  simply  obtained  by 
removing  the  time  parameter.  A  non-temporal  predicate  s  simply 
indicates  that  its  corresponding  temporal  predicate  st  applies  at  all 
times,  i.e.,  s  ®"t,  st.  Inversely,  st  means  that  status  predicate  s 
holds  at  time  t.  The  second  column  of  Table  2  specifies  the 
evaluation  domain  for  the  predicates  in  the  first  column.  The  third 
column  describes  the  semantics  of  the  predicate. 
Table  2:    Various  status  predicates 
Predicate(st)  Evaluation 
Domain(DOM) 
Semantics 
P:permission  set,  R:role  set,  U:user  set,  S:set  of  sessions,  T:time  instants,  and 
rÎ  R,  pÎ  P,  u  Î  U,  s  Î  S,  t  Î  T 
enabled(r,  t)
  R  ´  T      r  is  enabled  at  time  t 
u_assigned(u,  r,  t)  U  ´R  ´  T  u  is  assigned  to  r  at  time 
t 
p_assigned(p,  r,  t)  P  ´  R  ´T  p  is  assigned  to  r  at    t 
can_activate  (u,  r,  t)  U  ´R  ´  T  u  can  activate  r  at  t 
can_acquire  (u,    p,  t)
  U  ´P  ´  T  u  can  acquire  p  at  t 
r_can_acquire  (u,p,  r,  t)  U  ´P  ´  R  ´T  u  can  acquire  p  through 
r  at  t 
can_be_acquired(p,  r,t)
  P  ´  R  ´T  p  can  be  acquired 
through  r  at  t 
active(u,  r,  t)  U  ´  R  ´T  r  is  active  in  u’s  session 
at  t 
s_active(u,  r,  s,  t)  U  ´R  ´  S  ´T  r  is  active  in  u’s  session 
s  at  t 
acquires(u,  p,  t)  U  ´P  ´T  u  acquires  p  at  t 
r_acquires(u,  p,  r,  t)  U  ´P  ´  R  ´T  u  acquires  p  through  r  at 
t 
s_acquires(u,  p,  s,  t)  U  ´P  ´  S  ´T  u  acquires  p  in  session  s 
at  t   
rs_acquires(u,  p,  r,    s,  t)  U  ´P  ´  R  ´  S  ´T  u  acquires  p  through  r  in 
session  s  at  t 
 
Predicate  enabled(r,  t),  u_assigned(u,  r,  t)  and 
p_assigned(p,  r,  t)  refer  to  the  status  of  roles,  and  user-role 
and  role-permission  assignments  at  time  t.  Predicate 
can_activate(u,  r,  t)  implies  that  user  u  can  activate  role  r  at 
time  t.  It  allows  us  to  capture  the  fact  that  a  user  u  may  be  able  to 
activate  role  r  without  being  explicitly  assigned  to  it,  as  it  is 
possible  in  a  hierarchy  that  incorporates  the  activation-inheritance 
semantics  [13].  In  other  words,  “u  can  activate  r”  implies  that 
user  u  is  implicitly  or  explicitly  assigned  to  role  r.  It  does  not  rule 
out  the  possibility  that  some  activation  or  SoD  constraints  prevent 
the  actual  activation  of  r  by  u  at  time  t.  Predicate 
can_acquire(u,  p,  t)  implies  that  “u  can  acquire  permission  p” 
at  time  t.  Predicate  r_can_acquire(u,  p,  r,  t)  provides  much 
finer  level  of  information  than  can_acquire(u,  p,  t)  and 
indicates  that    “u  can  acquire  permission  p  through  role  r”  at  time 
t.  can_acquire(u,  p,  t)  can  be  semantically  defined  in  terms  of 
r_can_acquire(u,  p,  r,  t)  as  shown  in  Table  3. 
can_be_acquired(u,  r,  t)  implies  that  permission  “p  can  be 
acquired  through  role  r”  at  time  t. 
Table  3:    Semantic  relation  between  GTRBAC  status 
1  can_acquire  (u,    p,  t)   «    $  r  Î  R,  r_can_acquire  (u,  p,  r,  t) 
2  active  (u,    r,  t)   «    $  s  Î  S,  active  (u,  r,  s,  t) 
3  acquires  (u,    p,  t)   «  $  r  Î  R,  r_acquires  (u,  p,  r,  t) 
4  acquires  (u,    p,  t)   «    $  s  Î  S,  s_acquires  (u,  p,  s,  t) 
5  acquires  (u,    p,  r,  t)   «  $  s  Î  S,  rs_acquires  (u,  p,  r,    s,  t)   
6  acquires  (u,    p,  s,  t)   «    $  r  Î  R,  rs_acquires  (u,  p,  r,    s,  t) 
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  can_activate(u,  r,  t), 
can_acquire(u,  p,  t),  r_can_acquire(u,  p,  r,  t)  and 
can_be_acquired(u,  r,  t)  predicates  do  not  assume  anything 
about  the  state  of  a  role.  That  is,  they  do  not  say  in  which  state 
role  r  is  at  time  t.  For  example,  if  can_activate(u,  r,  t)  and 
enabled(r,  t)  hold,  then  a  user  u’s  request  to  activate  r  at  time  t 
is  granted  provided  there  are  no  other  activation  or  SoD 
constraints  prohibiting  it.  However,  if  can_activate(u,  r,  t) 
holds  but  not  enabled(r,  t),  then  u’s  request  to  activate  r  at  time 
t  is  denied.  Thus,  these  predicates  indicate  possibility  rather  than 
what  actually  occurs. 
Predicates  active(u,  r,  t),  s_active(u,  r,  s,  t),  acquires(u, 
p,  t),  r_acquires(u,  p,  r,  t),  s_acquires(u,  p,  s,  t)  and 
rs_acquires(u,  p,  r,  s,  t)  refer  to  what  actually  occurs  at  time 
instant  t.  active(u,  r,  t)  indicates  that  role  r  is  active  in  a  user 
u’s  session  at  time  t  and  can  be  expressed  using  predicate 
s_active(u,  r,  t)  as  shown  in  the  Table  3.  acquires(u,  p,  t) 
implies  that  a  user    “  u  acquires  permission  p  at  time  t”  and  can  be 
expressed  in  terms  of  r_acquires(u,  p,  r,  t)  and 
s_acquires(u,  p,  s,  t),  which  in  turn  can  be  defined  in  terms  of 
rs_acquires(u,  p,  r,  s,  t).  The  following  axioms,  as  introduced 
in  [13],  capture  the  key  relationships  among  various  predicates  in 
Table  1  and  provide  the  basis  for  defining  precisely  the 
permission-acquisition  and  role-activation  semantics  of  a 
GTRBAC  system. 
Axioms:    For  all  r  Î  R,  u  Î  U,  p  Î  P,  s  Î  S,  and  time  instant  t  Î 
T  =  {0,µ},  the  following  implications  hold: 
1.  assigned(p,  r,  t)® 
 can_be_acquired(p,  r,  t) 
2.  assigned(u,  r,  t)  ®  can_activate  (u,  r,  t) 
3.  can_activate  (u,  r,  t)  Ù  can_be_acquired(p,  r,  t)   ®   
can_acquire  (u,    p,  t) 
4.  active(u,  r,  t)  Ù  can_be_acquired(p,  r,  t)  ®   
acquires(u,  p,  t) 
Axiom  (1)  states  that  if  a  permission  is  assigned  to  a  role,  then  it 
“can  be  acquired”  through  that  role.  Axiom  (2)  states  that  all        
users  assigned  to  a  role  can  activate  that  role.  Axiom  (3)  states 
that  if  a  user  u  can  activate  a  role  r,  then  all  the  permissions  that 
can  be  acquired  through  r  can  be  acquired  by  u.  Thus,  for  the 
case  where  user  u  and  permission  p  are  assigned  to  r,  the  axioms 
imply  that  u  can  acquire  p.  Similarly,  axiom  (4)  states  that  if  there 
is  a  user  session  in  which  a  user  u  has  activated  a  role  r  then  u 
acquires  all  the  permissions  that  can  be  acquired  through  role  r. 
We  note  that  axioms  (1)  and  (2)  indicate  that  permission 
acquisition  and  role  activation  semantics  is  governed  by  explicit 
user-role  and  role  permission  assignments.  Next,  we  define  a 
predicate  evaluation  function  ￿￿￿￿  over  the  status  predicates  and  a 
projection  operation  Pp1,  p2,  ..,  pm  over  the  evaluation  of  a  predicate 
as  follows. 
Definition  3.1(￿￿￿￿￿ ￿Pi):  Let  st(alist)  be  a  status  predicate,  where 
alist  is  a  list  of  arguments  a1,  …,  ai,  …,  an  associated  with 
domains  D1,  …,  Di,  …,  Dn,  respectively  ("jÎ{1,  ..n},  Dj  Î{R,  P, 
U,  S,  T})  .  If  DOM  is  the  evaluation  domain  of  st(alist),  then,  we 
define  evaluation  function  ￿￿￿￿  and  projection  operator  Pp1,  p2,  .., 
pm  as  follows: 
·  ￿￿￿￿(st(alist))={(x1,  …,  xi,  …,  xn)  |  ((x1,  …,  xi,  …,  xn) 
ÎDOM)  Ù  st(x1,  …,  xi,  …,  xn)} 
·  Pp1,  p2,  ..,  pm￿￿￿￿(st(alist))={(xp1,  xp2  ..,  xpm)  |  {p1,  p2,  …,  pm} 
Í  {1,  2,  …,  n};  "xpiÎDpi,;  and  for  all  pairs  (x1,  x2…  ,  xn),  (y1, 
y2…  ,  yn)  Î  ￿￿￿￿(st(a1,  …  ai-1,  ai,  ai+1,…,  an)),  xj  =  yj  for  all 
all  j  Î  {1,  2,  …,  n}/{p1,  p2,  …,  pm};    moreover,  for  all  such  j 
we  replace  the  argument  by  its  constant  value  in  quotes,  i.e., 
we  denote  a  constant  value  xÎD   by  “x”  in  the  argument  list} 
Evaluation  function  ￿￿￿￿  returns  the  subset  of  the  evaluation 
domain  corresponding  to  the  predicate  that  it  evaluates.  For 
instance,  ￿￿￿￿  (enabled(r,  t))  is  a  subset  of  domain  (R  ´  T). 
Similarly,  Pp1,  p2,  ..,  pm  allows  us  to  project  the  evaluation  of  a 
predicate  over  a  particular  argument  indexed  by  i.  For  instance, 
P1￿￿￿￿(enabled(r,  “t”))  returns  the  set  of  all  roles  that  are 
enabled  at  time  “t”.  Similarly,  P2￿￿￿￿(enabled(“r”,  t))  returns 
the  set  of  all  time  instants  at  which  role  “r”  is  enabled.  Let  us 
denote  the  set  of  all  projection  functions  over  the  predicates 
defined  in  Table  2  as  P.  Note  that  we  can  also  have  evaluation  of 
the  negation  of  the  predicates  of  Table  2,  for  instance,  P1￿￿￿￿ 
(Øenabled(r,  “t”)).  P
-1  denotes  the  set  of  projection  operators 
over  negated  predicates.  Based  on  these  projection  operators  and 
the  original  set  of  set  elements  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ={R,  U,  P,  S,  T},  we  build  a 
framework  for  expressing  exhaustive  set  of  cardinality  constraints 
as  follows.  Let  ￿ ￿   Î  {È,  Ç,  ¤  }  be  a  set  operation,  then  we  have  a 
generic  set  function  f  as  follows: 
1.  f  Î(  P￿È  P
-1￿ ￿ ￿
2.  f  =  (f  ￿ ￿   X),    where  X  Í  E  Î￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ;￿
3.  f  =  (f1  ￿ ￿   f2),  where  f1 and  f2 are  generic  set  functions. 
We  can  express  a  cardinality  constraint  as  (|f|  ￿ ￿ ￿   n),  where  |f|  is 
the  number  of  elements  in  set  f,  ￿ ￿ ￿   Î{=,  ¹,  <,  >,  ³,  £}  is  a 
comparator  operator,  and  n  is  a  positive  number.  Some  examples 
of  the  cardinality  constraint  expressions  are  shown  in  Table  4.  It  is 
to  be  noted  that  while  projection  operators  in  P
  make  sense  in 
general  context  (as  shown  in  Table  4),  those  in  P
-1  may  not  have  a 
clear  meaning.  Therefore,  care  should  be  taken  in  constructing 
cardinality  constraints  based  on  them.  For  example,  the  function 
P2￿￿￿￿(Øactive(“u”,  r,  “t”))  refers  to  a  set  of    roles  that  are 
not  active  in  any  of  user  u’s  sessions  at  time  t.  Hence, 
|P2￿￿￿￿(Øactive(“u”,  r,  “t”))|  £  n  states  that  the  number  of 
roles  not  active  in  any  of  user  u’s  sessions  at  time  t  cannot  be 
more  than  n.  However,  it  is  not  clear  whether  it  is  n  out  of  those 
that  u  can  activate  or  that  are  in  R.  Depending  upon  application, 
distinction  may  need  to  be  made  a  priori.  For  instance,  we  can  say 
that,  “by  default,  out  of  those  that  u  can  activate”.  Periodicity  and 
duration  constraints  on  a  cardinality  constraint  C  =  (|f|  ￿ ￿ ￿   n)  can 
be  simply  defined  using  the  GTRBAC  temporal  framework  as  (I, 
P,  C),  which  indicates  that  the  cardinality  constraint  is  valid  for 
each  instant  in  intervals  defined  by  (I,  P),  and  as  ([I,  P,|  D],  Dx  C), 
with  Dx  indicating  the  duration  in  which  the  cardinality  constraint 
is  valid. 
We  note  that  some  cardinality  constraints  of  type  C  =  (|Pp1,  p2,  .., 
pm￿￿￿￿(st(plist))|  ￿ ￿ ￿   n)  may  not  have  direct  application  in  a 
general  RBAC  framework.  For  example,  P1￿￿￿￿(s_active(u, 
“r”,  “s”,  “t”))  (set  of  users  that  have  activated  r  in    session  s  at 
time  t)  associates  multiple  users  with  the  same  session.  Such  cases 
may  be  useful  if  we  consider  a  collaborative  system  where  a 
session  is  created  with  multiple  active  users. 
4.  GTRBAC  TRIGGERS  AND  CONTROL 
FLOW  DEPENDENCCY  CONSTRAINTS 
Another  set  of  constraints  that  are  often  needed  in  the  commercial 
systems  is  that  of  dependencies  between  roles  and  other  events 
associated  with  RBAC  entities.  GTRBAC  provides  a  trigger 
mechanism  that  can  be  used  to  express  some  dependency 
constraints.  However,  there  are  much  stricter  forms  of  dependency 
constraints  known  as  control  flow  dependency  (CFD)  constraints, 
which  are  needed  in  various  applications.    In  this  section,  we 
extend  the  original  GTRBAC  triggers  and  define  the  CFD 
constraints  using  extended  triggers 
4.1  Extended-GTRBAC  Triggers 
The  basic  trigger  expression  of  GTRBAC  is  of  the  form:  (E1  ,…, 
Em,  C1  ,…,  Ck      ®    pr:E  after  ￿t),  where  Ei  is  an  event  and  Ci 
is  a  status  condition  [12].  Semantically,  it  means  that  the 
prioritized  event  pr:E  with  priority  pr  can  take  place  ￿t  time  units 
after  the  trigger  fires.  The  definition,  however,  is  limiting  in  the 
Table  4.  Examples  of  cardinality  constraints 
1  |P1￿￿￿￿(enabled(r,  “t”)|    ³  n 
Number  of  roles  enabled  at 
time  “t”  cannot  be  less  than 
n 
2  |P1￿￿￿￿(Øenabled(r,  “t”)|      £  n 
Number  of  roles  disabled  at 
time  “t”  cannot  be  more  than 
n. 
3  |P2￿￿￿￿(u_assigned(“u”,  r,  “t”))|  £  n 
Number  of  roles  assigned  to 
“u”  at  time  “t”  cannot  be 
more  than  n 
4  |P2￿￿￿￿(can_activate(“u”,  r,"t”))|  £    n) 
Set  of  roles  that  u  can 
activate  at  time  t  cannot  be 
more  than  n. 
5  (Daytime,|P1￿￿￿￿(u_assignedSet(u,  “Nurse”,  t)|  £  n)  indicates   
Number  of  users  assigned  to  Nurse  role  in  Daytime  cannot  exceed  n        
following  ways:  (1)  it  only  allows  scenarios  in  which  all  the 
antecedent  events  E1,…,  and  Em  occur  at  the  same  time  and  all  the 
conditions  C1  ,…,  and  Ck  hold;  it  does  not  allow  capturing  history 
information  in  which  events  are  spread  in  the  temporal  dimension; 
(2)  it  does  not  allow  specifying  temporal  intervals  in  which  the 
occurence  of  an  event  Ei  can    take  place,  or  a  condition  Ci  is 
satisfied;  (3)  it  is  possible  that  in  some  cases  a  condition  Ci  must 
be  valid  for  a  specified  duration  before  triggering  the  event  E; 
such  a  requirement  is  also  not  captured  by  the  current  triggers; 
and  (4)  the  current  trigger  considers  that  E  ¹  s:activate  r 
for  u;  this  needlessly  prevents  specifying  any  preconditions  for 
activation  events.  In  some  cases,  an  activation  request  may  need 
to  be  granted  only  if  certain  conditions  have  been  satisfied.  We 
define  the  extended  trigger  form,  which  is  temporally  more 
expressive  than  the  current  GTRBAC  triggers  and  does  not  have 
the  above  limitations,  as  follows: 
Definition  4.1  (Extended  Triggers):  The  extended  trigger 
expression  has  the  following  form: 
(E1  in  p1)  op1  …  opm  -1  (Em  in  pm)  op  m   (C1  in  t1 for  d1) 
opm+1…  opm+n-1  (Cn  in  tn  for  dn)   
®  pr:E  after  ￿t    for  ￿d,  where   
·  Eis  are  simple  event  expressions  or  run  time  requests;  and 
Cis  are  GTRBAC  status  expressions, 
·  pr:E  is  a  prioritized  event  expression  with  priority  pr.     
·  If  (E  =s:activate  r  for  u)  is  an  activation  request  at 
time  ta  ³  (t  +￿t)  then  active(u,  r,  s,  t)  is  true  in  the 
interval  (ta,  ta+￿d),  provided  that  the  trigger  fires  at  time  t, 
·  the  trigger  is  fired  if  ti  (pi)  is  an  interval  such  that  there 
exists  a  t  Îti  (pi)  at  which  Ci  (Ei)  becomes  valid,  and  Ci 
remains  valid  for  duration  di;  we  simply  write  “Ci  in  ti”  to 
mean  that  there  exists  a  t  Î  ti  at  which  C  i  is  valid  for  some 
duration;  we  write  “Ci  at  t”  (“Ei  at  t”  )  instead  of    “Ci  in 
ti”  (“Ei  in  t”  )  when  ti  (pi)  =  (t,  t);  we  write  “Ci  for  di”  to 
mean  that  Ci  is  valid  for  some  duration  di.   
·  ￿t  is  the  duration  between  the  firing  of  the  trigger  and  the 
occurence  of  the  event  E,  and  ￿d  is  the  duration  for  which 
the  event  E  remains  valid.  If  not  specified,  ￿t  =  0,  and  ￿d  = 
µ  opi  Î{Ú,  Ù}  and  Ù  has  precedence  over  Ú.  For  simplicity, 
we  use  “,”  to  denote  the  Ù  operator  and  “|”  to  denote  the  Ú 
operator.   
We  note  that  the  old  trigger  form  cannot  be  used  to  specify  the 
temporal  information  such  as  “Ei  in  pi”  or  “Ci  in  ti”.  The  earlier 
form  is  actually  a  special  case  of  the  extended  form,  in  which  all 
the  antecedent  events  and  conditions  are  associated  with  the  same 
time  instant.  That  is,  for  any  t, 
E1  at  t,..,  Em  at  t,  C1  at  t,..,  Ck  at  t   
®  pr:E  after  ￿t,    (a) 
The  duration  information  ￿d  associated  with  the  triggered  event 
E  in  the  extended  trigger  simplifies  specification  but  does  not 
increase  the  expressive  power  over  the  earlier  form.  The  following 
trigger: 
(E1  at  t,…,  Em  at  t,  C1  at  t,…,  Ck  at  t  ®     
pr:E  after  ￿t  for  ￿d)      (b) 
is  semantically  equivalent  to  the  combination  of  the  following  two 
old  triggers 
1.  E1  ,…,  Em,  C1  ,…,  Ck    ®    pr:E  after  ￿t, 
2.  E  ®    pr’:Conf(E)  after  ￿d,  where  Conf(E)  is  the 
conflicting  event  of  E  and  pr’  ³    pr. 
We  note  that  the  triggers  of  form  (a)  (one  with  “at  tn”  phrase)  can 
represent  the  extended  form  (one  with  “in  pm”  phrase),  however, 
it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  extended  form  achieves  compaction  in 
expression  over  the  form  (a).  For  instance,  the  extended  trigger 
form  without  the  “for  d1”  part  can  only  be  represented  by  using 
multiple  triggers  of  form  (a),  each  with  a  permutation  of  time 
instants  from  p1,  p2,…,  pm,  t1,  t2,…,  tn.  Similar  compaction  is 
achieved  by  the  use  of  the  two  logical  operators. 
Note  that  triggers  allow  GTRBAC  events  and  status  conditions 
only  [12,  13].  However,  it  can  easily  be  extended  to  include  other 
events  and  conditions.  For  instance,  condition  Ci  can  be  any 
predicate  expression  that  evaluates  contextual  information  that 
affects  access  control  decisions.  Consider  the  following  trigger; 
(Location(x)  =  “EmergencyRoom”)  |  (situation  ()= 
“LifeThreatening”)  ®    pr:E  enable  EmergencyDoctor 
Here,  if  the  room,  indicated  by  variable  x,  is  EmergencyRoom,  or 
the  current  situation  is  LifeThreatening  then  the 
EmergencyDoctor  role  is  enabled,  thus  capturing  environmental 
context.  Similarly,  we  can  allow  event  E  to  be  any  system  related 
event.  With  a  predefined  set  of  predicates  to  capture  static  as  well 
as  dynamic  environmental  conditions  and  events,  the  extended 
GTRBAC  trigger  framework  can  easily  provide  a  very  elaborate 
support  for  context-based  access  control. 
4.2  Control  Flow  Dependency  Constraints 
Control  flow  dependency  (CFD)  constraints  often  occur  in  task-
oriented  systems  and  are  stricter  forms  of  dependency  constraints 
than  those  that  can  be  expressed  using  GTRBAC  triggers.  The 
following  example  illustrates  such  CFD  constraints. 
Example:  Consider  the  following  requirements:  (1)  a  junior 
employee  of  an  office  is  allowed  to  activate  the 
Junior_Employee  role  in  the  system  only  if  his  manager  has 
activated  the  Manager  role;  (2)  whenever  a  system 
administrator  makes  some  changes  in  the  system,  the  activation 
of  the  SysAdmin  role  that  he  uses  must  enable  the  SysAudit 
role  so  that  another  user  can  activate  the  SysAudit  role  and  log 
those  changes.  The  SysAudit  role  may  need  to  be  activated  by 
the  user  within  the  next  t  minutes;  (3)  everyday,  if  both  the 
roles  SysAdmin  and  SysAudit  are  activated,  then  the 
SysAdmin  role  must  be  activated  before  the  SysAudit  role. 
The  three  requirements  imply  (1)  pre-condition,  (2)  post-
condition  and  (3)  precedence  constraints.  Next,  we  show  that 
GTRBAC  does  not  adequately  model  these  constraints,  but,  we 
can  semantically  define  CFDs  in  terms  of  these  triggers.          
4.2.1  Pre-condition  Constraints   
A  pre-condition  constraint  between  two  events  essentially  implies 
that  an  event  can  occur  only  if  the  other  event  has  already 
occurred  and/or  the  required  conditions  have  already  become  true, 
as  in  the  first  case  above.  The  following  trigger  closely  resembles 
the  pre-condition  constraint  (1): 
s:activate  Manager  for  John  ®  enable 
Junior_Employee   
(assume  John  is  the  manager) 
However,  the  “only  if”  semantics  of  the  pre-condition  constraint 
requires  that  there  be  no  other  events  that  will  enable  the 
Junior_Employee  role,  i.e.,  the  Junior_Employee  role  is  not 
enabled  if    John  does  not  activate  the  Manager  role.  This  means 
the  above  trigger  can  enforce  the  pre-condition  constraint  only  if 
we  also  enforce  additional  restriction  that  no  other  constraint  or 
trigger  allows  the  enabling  of  the  Junior_Employee  role. 
However,  GTRBAC’s  trigger  mechanism  currently  does  not  imply 
such  an  additional  restriction,  hence,  it  falls  short  in  providing 
support  for  the  pre-condition  constraint.  For  instance,  in  addition 
to  the  above  trigger,  assume  that  we  also  have  the  following 
periodicity  constraint:   
Everday  between  9am  and  6pm,  enable  Junior_Employee 
Presence  of  this  periodicity  constraint  does  not  allow  the  above 
trigger  to  enforce  the  pre-condition  constraint  as  it  allows  the  role 
to  be  enabled  even  if  the  Manager  role  is  not  enabled. 
4.2.2  Post-condition  Constraints   
A  post-condition  constraint  between  two  events  essentially 
implies  that  if  an  event  occurs  or  a  condition  is  satisfied  then  the 
other  event  also  must  occur,  as  indicated  in  the  second  case  in  the 
example  above.  Here,  if  the  SysAdmin  role  is  enabled  then  the 
SysAudit  role  must  also  be  enabled,  otherwise,  it  may  incur 
certain  security  risks.  However,  the  activation  of  the  SysAudit 
role  may  also  be  triggered  by  other  events  in  the  system.  In 
essence,  the  post-condition  constraint  will  not  be  enforced  if  there 
are  some  other  triggers  or  constraints  that  do  not  allow  the 
SysAudit  role  to  be  enabled  even  though  the  SysAdmin  role  has 
been  enabled.  Thus,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  following  trigger:   
enable  SysAdmin  ®  enable  SysAudit 
enforces  the  post-condition  constraint  only  if  the  system 
additionally  makes  sure  that  there  are  no  other  constraints  or 
triggers  that  prohibits  enabling  of  the  SysAudit  role  when  this 
trigger  fires;  this  cannot  be  expressed  using  GTRBAC  triggers   
4.2.3  Precedence  Constraints   
A  precedence  constraint  is  said  to  exist  between  two  events  if 
there  is  a  condition  that  if  the  two  events  occur  then  one  must 
always  precede  the  other,  as  shown  in  requirement  (3).  Another 
real  world  scenario  in  which  such  a  precedence  semantics  applies 
is  a  pair  of  tasks  involving  authorizing  a  check  and  cashing  it.    It 
is  easy  to  see  that  such  precedence  semantics  is  not  enforced  by 
triggers  alone. 
4.2.4  Definitions  of  CFD  Constraints 
Next,  we  formalize  syntax  and  semantics  of  the  CFD  constraints 
in  GTRBAC  using  triggers.  In  the  definitions  we  will  use  (ts,  te), 
such  that  (ts,  te)  is  in  an  interval  of  (I,  P),  or  (ts,  te)  is  some 
duration  D.  For  (ts,  te)  =  D,  ts  is  the  time  instant  when  D  starts  and 
is  non-deterministic.  A  constraint  c  =  (D,  C)  needs  to  be  enabled 
by  a  trigger  or  a  runtime  event  [12].  Assume  that  T  is  the  set  of  all 
GTRBAC  constraints  and  Causes(c,  pr:E,  t)  is  a  predicate  that 
evaluates  to  true  if  there  is  a  constraint  c  in  T  which  causes  event 
pr:E  to  fire  at  time  t.  Furthermore,  we  use  Y  to  denote  the  left 
hand  side  of  a  trigger  expression,  i.e.,   
Y  = 
E1  in  p1,  …,  Em  in  pm,  C1  in  t1 for  d1,…,  Cn  in  tn  for  dn 
The  following  precedence  rule  is  applied  in  a  GTRBAC  system  - 
if  there  are  conflicting  pairs  of  events  (e.g.,  assign  and 
deassign,  activate  and  deactivate,  etc.)  then  the 
negative  event  takes  precedence  (e.g.,  deassign  takes 
precedence  over  assign)  if  the  priority  of  the  two  events  are  the 
same;  otherwise  the  higher  priority  event  takes  precedence. 
Definition  4.2  (Pre-condition  constraint):  The  pre-condition 
constraint  is  expressed  as  ([I,  P|D,] pre,  Y,  pr:E  after  ￿t  for 
￿d).  Semantically,  to  say  that  ([I,  P|D,] pre,  Y,  pr:E  after  ￿t 
for  ￿d)    Î  T  is  equivalent  to  saying  that:     
(1)  (Y  ®    pr:E  after  ￿t  for  ￿d)  t  Î  T  is  an  extended-
trigger,  and   
(2)  Ø$  c  Î  T  s.t.  ("tx  Î  (t  +￿t,    t  +  ￿t  +  ￿d)  and  pr’³  pr, 
Causes(c,  pr’:  E,  tx))  is  true  for  pr’³  pr. 
Definition  4.3  (Post-condition  constraint):  The  post-condition 
constraint  is  expressed  as  ([I,  P|D,] post,  Y,  pr:E  after  ￿t). 
Semantically,  to  say  that  ([I,  P|D,] post,  Y,  pr:E  after  ￿t  for 
￿d)    is  in  T  is  equivalent  to  saying  that:   
(1)  (Y  ®    pr:E  after  ￿t  for  ￿d)  t  Î  T  is  an  extended-
trigger;   
(2)  (2)  Ø$  c  Î  T  s.t.  "  tx  Î  (t  +￿t,    t  +  ￿t  +  ￿d),  Causes(c, 
pr’:  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (E),  tx)  is  true  for  pr’³  pr. 
Note  that  condition  (2)  in  each  definition  ensures  that  the 
additional  condition  required  for  the  two  CFDs,  as  discussed 
earlier,  are  enforced.  Next,  we  define  a  precedence  constraint, 
which  relates  two  events.  We  can  also  define  a  CFD  with  “if  and 
only  if”  by  combining  above  two  constraints.  Next  we  define 
precedence  constraint  that  essentially  relates  two  events. 
Definition  4.4  (Precedence  constraint):  Let  pr1:E1  and  pr2:E2  be 
prioritized  events  such  that  ([I,  P|D,] prec,  pr1:E1,  pr2:E2  after 
￿t),  i.e.  pr2:E2 is  precedent  on  pr1:E1.  Then,  for  all  t  such  that  t  Î 
(ts,  te):   
  ([I,  P|D,] precedence,  pr1:E1,  pr2:E2)  ®   
(for  each  pair  c1,  c2  Î  T,  Causes(c1,  pr:E1,  t1)  Ù 
Causes(c2,  pr:E2,  t2)  ®    (te£t1+￿t  £  t2£ ts)) 
The  safety  notion  introduced  in  TRBAC  identifies  scenarios  that 
have  ambiguous  execution  semantics,  for  example,  the  existence 
of  a  cycling  dependency  among  events  through  triggers  [12].  The 
safety  checking  algorithm  can  be  easily  extended  to  identify  the 
violation  of  the  CFD  constraint  by  introducing  extra  checks  to 
ensure  that  additional  restrictions  are  enforced  for  the  CFDs.        
5.  TIME  BASED  SEPRATION  OF  DUTY 
Separation  of  Duty  (SoD)  policies  have  been  found  to  be  very 
crucial  for  securing  commercial  applications.  Role-based  systems 
are  particularly  very  beneficial  for  expressing  and  enforcing  such 
policies.  Various  SoDs  have  been  identified  in  the  literature  [8, 
14,  17,  18].  However,  all  earlier  researches  focus  on  SoDs  in  a 
non-temporal  environment.  The  CFD  constraints  introduced  in 
previous  section  can  also  be  used  to  define  SoD  constraints  that 
are  based  on  access  history,  such  as  history-dependent  SoD, 
order-dependent  SoD,  object-based  SoD,  which  are  identified  in 
[18],  as  the  triggers  can  capture  timing  information.  In  this 
section,  we  define  various  SoD  constraints  that  cannot  be  captured 
Table  5.  Enabling  time  and  Assignment  SoDs 
SoD  Type  Expression    (SoD) 
Semantics 
"u,  u1,  u2Î  U,  "r,  r1,  r2Î  R,  "p,  p1,  p2Î  R,  "t  Î  Sol(I,  P),    (u1¹  u2),  (r1¹  r2)  and  (p1¹  p2)  the  following  holds: 
Enabling/Disabling  SoD   
(I,  P,  EN  ,  R)    SoD  Ù  enabled(r1,  t)  ®  Øenabled(r2,  t)  EN-SoD 
  No  two  roles  in  R  can  be  enabled  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(DIS-SoD) 
(DIS-SoD) 
(I,  P,  DIS,  R)    SoD  Ù  disabled(r1,  t)  ®  Ødisabled(r2,  t) 
  No  two  roles  in  R  can  be  disabled  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
User-Role  assignment/de-assignment  SoDs   
(I,  P,  UAS1,  U,  R)  SoD  Ù  u_assigned(u,  r1,  t)  ®  Øu_assigned(u,  r2,  t)   
UAS-SoD1 
No  two  roles  in  R  can  be  assigned  to  a  user  in  U  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  UAS1,  U,  R)  "rÎ  R,  SoD  Ù  u_assigned(u1,  r,  t)  ®  Øu_assigned(u2,  r,  t) 
UAS-SoD2 
No  two  users  in  U  can  be  assigned  to  a  role  in  R  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P). 
(I,  P,  UAS3,  U,  R)  SoD  Ù  u_assigned(u1,  r1,  t)
 ®  Øu_assigned(u2,  r2,  t) 
  UAS-SoD3 
Different  users  in  U  cannot  be  assigned  different  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  UAS4,  U,  R)  SoD  «  UAS-SoD2 Ù  UAS-SoD3  
UAS-SoD4 
Roles  in  R  can  be  assigned  to  only  one  of  the  users  in  U  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  UAS5,  U,  R)    SoD  «  UAS-SoD1 Ù  UAS-SoD3 
UAS-SoD5 
Users  in  U  can  be  assigned  only  one  of  the  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  UAS6,  U,  R)  SoD  «  UAS-SoD1 Ù  UAS-SoD2 
UAS-SoD6 
A  role  in  R  can  be  assigned  to  only  one  user  in  U  (and  vice  versa)  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
Role-Permission  assignment/de-assignment  SoDs   
(I,  P,  PAS1,  P,  R)  "pÎP,  SoD  Ù  p_assigned(p,  r1,  t)  ®  Øp_assigned(p,  r2,  t)  PAS-SoD1 
  No  two  roles  in  R  can  be  assigned  a  permission  in  P  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  PAS2,  P,  R)  "rÎ  R,  SoD  Ù  p_assigned(p1,  r,  t)  ®  Øp_assigned(p2,  r,  t) 
PAS-SoD2   
No  two  permissions  in  P  can  be  assigned  to  a  role  in  R  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P).   
(I,  P,  PAS3,  P,  R)  "p1,  p2ÎP,  SoD  Ù  p_assigned(p1,  r1,  t)
 ®  Øp_assigned(p2,  r2,  t) 
PAS-SoD3 
Different  permissions  in  P  cannot  be  assigned  to  different  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  PAS4,  P,  R)  SoD  «  PAS-SoD2 Ù  PAS-SoD3 
PAS-SoD4 
Roles  in  R  can  be  assigned  only  one  of  the  permissions  in  P  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P). 
(I,  P,  PAS5,  P,  R)  SoD  «  PAS-SoD1 Ù  PAS-SoD3 
PAS-SoD5 
Permissions  in  P  can  be  assigned  to  only  one  of  the  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  PAS6,  P,  R)  SoD  «  PAS-SoD1 Ù  PAS-SoD2 
PAS-SoD6 
Permissions  in  P  can  be  assigned  to  only  one  of  the  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P)        
by  such  CFD  constraints,  and  some  of  which  correspond  to  those 
already  identified  in  the  literature.  These  SoDs  will  be  defined 
with  respect  to  GTRBAC  status  predicates  introduced  in  Table  2.   
5.1  Role  Enabling/Disabling  Time  SoDs 
(predicates:  enabled/disabled) 
The  SoD  constraints  related  to  enabling  and  disabling  events  are 
shown  in  Table  5.  EN-SoD  indicates  that  roles  from  a  given  role 
set  cannot  be  enabled  at  the  same  time.  If  there  are  role  enabling 
events  that  attempt  to  enable  more  than  one  role  at  the  same  time 
then  the  enforcement  mechanism  must  use  some  criteria  to  enable 
only  one  of  the  roles.  SoD  DIS-SoD  is  defined  with  respect  to  the 
role  disabling  event.  The  difference  between  them  is  that  EN-SoD 
does  not  allow  all  the  roles  to  be  enabled  at  the  same  time  but 
allows  them  to  be  disabled  at  the  same  time,  whereas  DIS-SoD 
allows  all  to  be  enabled  at  the  same  time  but  does  not  allow  them 
to  be  disabled  at  the  same  time.  Role  enabling  SoDs  (EN-SoD)  are 
cases  where  limiting  access  is  a  primary  concern.  Similarly,  role 
disabling  SoD  (DIS-SoD)  is  more  useful  in  cases  where 
availability  is  the  key  concern,  for  example,  in  a  hospital,  a 
requirement  may  state  that  “Both  the  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   roles 
cannot  be  disabled  at  the  same  time”.  These  SoDs  can  be 
expressed  in  the  form  of  cardinality  constraints  introduced  earlier, 
e.g.,  EN-SoD  can  be  expressed  as  |P1￿￿￿￿(enabled(r,  t))  Ç  R|  £ 
1.  Similarly,  other  SoDs  defined  below  can  also  be  expressed  in 
this  form;  however,  we  use  uniformly  the  implication  rule  to 
provide  the  semantics  of  these  SoDs.   
5.2  Assignment  SoDs                                                               
(predicates:  u_assigned,  p_assigned) 
Table  5  defines  various  user-role  and  role-permission  assignment 
time  constraints.  UAS-SoD1  indicates  that  multiple  roles  from  R 
cannot  be  assigned  to  a  user  in  U  at  the  same  time.  Accordingly, 
the  roles  from  R  can  be  assigned  to  any  user  not  included  in  U.  In 
other  words,  this  implies  that  the  role  set  R  has  conflicting 
semantics  only  with  respect  to  the  user  set  U.  Allowing 
specification  of  such  a  set  of  conflicting  roles  with  respect  to  a 
particular  user  set  provides  the  benefit  of  expressing  fine-grained 
SoD  constraints.  UAS-SoD2  states  that  different  users  of  U  cannot 
be  assigned  to  a  role  in  R,  i.e.,  the  users  in  U  are  conflicting  with 
respect  to  role  set  R.  Figure  1  depicts  various  assignment 
combinations  that  are  not  allowed  by  the  user-role  assignment 
constraints  for  U  =  {u1,  u2}  and  R  =  {r1,  r2}.  Here,  a  line  from  u 
to  r  indicates  that  u  is  assigned  to  r.    In  general,  set  U  can  be 
expected  to  be  the  set  Users.  In  figure  1,  UAS-SoD1  does  not 
allow  assignment  combinations  depicted  in  (c),  whereas,  UAS-
SoD2  does  not  allow  assignment  combinations  shown  in  (b). 
UAS-SoD3  states  that  different  users  from  set  R  cannot  be 
assigned  to  different  roles.  Here,  U  and  R  have  conflicting 
semantics  with  respect  to  each  other.  Note  that  the  notion  of 
conflict  here  is  slightly  different  from  that  of  UAS-SoD1  and  UAS-
SoD2.  However,  this  constraint  allows  a  single  user  from  U  to  be 
assigned  to  multiple  roles  of  R,  and  a  single  role  from  R  to  be 
assigned  to  multiple  users.  UAS-SoD3  does  not  allow  assignment 
scenario  depicted  in  (a).  In  real  world  scenario,  U  of  UAS-SoD3 
may  refer  to  a  set  of  employees  who  are  related.  Assignment  of 
any  two  of  these  employees  to  different  roles  will  allow  them  to 
commit  fraud.  If,  for  instance,  one  employee  is  assigned  to  role 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ that￿ authorizes  checks)  and  another  is 
assigned  to  role  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   (for  cashing  authorized  checks), 
they  can  easily  commit  fraud.  Another  practical  scenario  in  which 
this  constraint  can  be  applicable  is  when  a  set  of  roles  represents 
subtasks  of  a  bigger  task,  with  the  constraint  that  the  different 
users  of  U  cannot  carry  out  different  subtasks. 
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u1 r1
u2 r2
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SoD  Doesn’t  Allow  SoD  Doesn’t  Allow 
UAS-SoD1  (c)  UAS-SoD4  (a),  (b) 
UAS-SoD2  (b)  UAS-SoD5  (a),  (c) 
UAS-SoD3  (a)  UAS-SoD6  (b),  (c) 
Figure  1.  User-assignment  SoDs  with  U={u1,u2}  and  R={r1,r2} 
 
UAS-SoD4,  UAS-SoD5  and  UAS-SoD6  can  be  derived  as 
combinations  of  earlier  SoDs,  as  shown  in  Table  5.  We  note  that, 
although  UAS-SoD3  allows  defining  constraints  such  as  all  the 
subtask  roles  need  be  assigned  to  the  same  user,  it  also  allows  the 
assignment  scenario  (b),  which  may  not  be  relevant  with  regards 
to  such  a  requirement.  UAS-SoD4,  for  instance,  omits  the 
possibility  of  assigning  all  the  users  to  the  same  subtask  role 
rendering  the  overall  task  un-accomplishable.  As  shown  in  the 
figure,  UAS-SoD5  prevents  the  set  of  assignments  of  type  shown 
in  (a)  and  (c)  –  i.e.  it  allows  multiple  users  to  be  assigned  to  only 
one  of  the  roles,  such  as  those  in  Figure  1(b).  That  is,  as  soon  as 
one  of  the  roles,  say  role  r,  is  assigned  to  a  user  then  none  of  the 
users  can  be  assigned  to  any  other  roles;  however,  role  r  can  be 
assigned  to  any  number  of  users.  An  example  of  application  of 
UAS-SoD5  is  the  assignment  of  a  given  set  of  consultants  (set  U) 
to  the  same  consultancy  duty  (assignment  of  all  the  users  to  the 
role  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿ ). 
The  role-permission  assignments  have  semantics  similar  to  that  of 
the  user-role  assignments.  Note  that,  here,  we  are  using  the  notion 
of  conflicting  permission,  for  example  in  PAS-SoD2. 
5.3  Role  Activation  Time  SoDs                         
(predicate:  active) 
Activation  time  constraints  are  listed  in  Table  6.  ACT-SoD1 
implies  that  activation  of  conflicting  roles  at  the  same  time  in  the 
same  session  or  different  sessions  by  a  user  in  U  is  not  allowed. 
Figure  2  depicts  the  scenarios  for  U  =  {u1,  u2}  and  R  =  {r1,  r2} 
when  both  the  roles  are  active.  Here,  s:  u1(r1,  r2)  indicates  that 
roles  r1  and  r2  are  active  in  u1’s  session  s.  ACT-SoD1  does  not 
(a)  (b)  (c)        
allow  activation  combinations  depicted  in  2(b)  and  2(c).  ACT-
SoD2  does  not  allow  activation  of  a  role  by  conflicting  users  at  the 
same  time.  Similarly,  ACT-SoD3  does  not  allow  conflicting  roles 
to  be  active  in  different  users’  sessions,  as  depicted  in  2(a).   
ACT-SoD4  does  not  allow  2(c),  i.e.  it  prevents  activation  of  the 
conflicting  roles  in  the  same  session  simultaneously.  ACT-SoD5 
does  not  allow  scenarios  depicted  in  2(b),  i.e.  it  prevents 
activation  of  the  conflicting  roles  in  the  different  sessions  of  the 
same  user  simultaneously.    ACT-SoD6  and  ACT-SoD7  are 
combinations  of  the  earlier  SoDs,  as  indicated  in  the  table. 
Figure  3  illustrates  the  usefulness  of  SoD  constraints  ACT-SoD1  - 
ACT-SoD5.  In  Figure  3(a),  roles  r1  and  r2  have  a  common  set  of 
permissions.  Now  suppose,  we  allow  users  u1  and  u2  assigned  to 
roles  r1  and  r2,  respectively,  to  activate  the  respective  roles  at  the 
same  time.  As  the  read  permission  on  the  object  Ox  is  available  to 
both  the  roles,  the  information  that  each  role  writes  to  object  Ox  is 
visible  to  the  other.  Hence,  Ox  opens  up  the  information  flow 
channel  between  the  two  users.  Common  permissions  like  these 
may  occur  explicitly,  in  a  non-hierarchical  case,  or  implicitly 
through  an  I-hierarchy  relation  such  as  in  the  one  shown  in  Figure 
3(a).  In  a  non-hierarchical  case,  declaring  the  two  roles  as 
conflicting  and  applying  ACT-SoD3  is  a  straightforward  solution  if 
such  information  flow  needs  to  be  contained.  Kuhn  [14]  indicates 
that  roles  that  have  common  permissions  cannot  form  a 
conflicting  pair.  We  believe  that  such  semantics  is  too  restrictive. 
Moreover,  with  that  semantics,  we  indirectly  impose  mutual 
exclusion  on  the  permission  sets  of  the  two  roles.  This  may  not  be 
what  is  required  in  the  practice.  For  example,  there  may  be 
situations  where  only  the  private  permissions  of  a  pair  of  roles  are 
conflicting,  but  the  roles  may  have  a  common  set  of  permissions.   
(c)
s:  ux (r1,  r2 )
(a)
(b)
s1:  u1  (rx)
s2:  u2  (ry)
rx,  ryÎ{r1,  r2};rx ¹ ry
s1:  ux (r1)
s2:  ux (r2)
ux Î{u1,  u2}
ux Î{u1,  u2}
(d)
s1:  u1  (rx)
s2:  u2  (rx)
rx Î{r1,  r2}
 
Table  6.  Activation  time  SoDs 
Activation  Time  SoDs 
Type  SoD 
Semantics 
"u,  u1,  u2Î  U,  "s,  p1,  p2Î  R,  "r,  r1,  r2Î  R,  "t  Î  Sol(I,  P),    (u1¹  u2),  (r1¹  r2)  and  (p1¹  p2),  the  following  holds: 
(I,  P,  ACT-SoD1,  U,  R)  "uÎU,  SoD  Ù  active(u,  r1,  t)  ®  Øactive(u,  r2,  t)    ACT-SoD1   
No  two  roles  in  R  can  be  in  active  state  in  session(s)  of  a  user  in  U  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  ACT-SoD2,  U,  R)  "uÎU,  SoD  Ù  active(u1,  r,  t)  ®  Øactive(u2,  r,  t)    ACT-SoD2   
No  two  users  in  U  can  have  a  role  in  R  active  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  ACT-SoD3  U,  R)  "u1,  u2ÎU,  SoD  Ù  active(u1,  r1,    t)  ®  Øactive(u2,  r2,  t) 
ACT-SoD3   
No  two  users  in  U  can  have  two  different  roles  in  R  active  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  ACT-SoD4,  U,  R)  "uÎU,"s  ÎS,  SoD  Ù  active(u,  r1,  s,  t)  ®  Øactive(u,  r2,  s,  t) 
ACT-SoD4   
Two  roles  in  R  cannot  be  in  active  state  at  the  same  time  in  a  single  session  of  a  user  in  U  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  ACT-SoD5,  U,  R)  "uÎU,"s1,  s2ÎS,  SoD  Ù  active(u,  r1,  s1,  t)  ®  Øactive(u,  r2,  s2,  t)  ACT-SoD5   
No  two  sessions  of  a  user  in  U  can  have  two  roles  in  R  active  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  ACT-SoD6,  U,  R)  SoD  «  ACT-SoD2Ù  ACT-SoD4  ACT-SoD6 
Roles  in  R  can  be  active  in  a  session(s)  of  only  one  of  the  users  in  U  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  ACT-SoD7,  U,  R)  SoD  «  ACT-SoD5 Ù  ACT-SoD6 
ACT-SoD7 
Roles  in  R  can  be  active  in  a  single  session  of  only  one  of  the  users  U  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
   
SoD  Does  not  allow  SoD  Does  not  allow 
ACT-SoD1  (b),  (c)  ACT-SoD5  (b) 
ACT-SoD2  (d)  ACT-SoD6  (a),  (d) 
ACT-SoD3  (a)  ACT-SoD7  (a),  (b)  ,  (d) 
ACT-SoD4  (c)     
Figure  2.  Activation  time  SoDs  for  U  =  {u1,  u2}  and  R  =  {r1,  r2}        
In  such  scenarios,  conflicting  roles  imply  conflicting  set  of  private 
permissions  only.  For  example,  an  ! ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿￿  role  in  general  can 
be  used  to  group  the  basic  set  of  permissions  available  to  all  the 
employees  of  an  organization.  We  may  have  two  roles  such  as 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿   and  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ,  which  are  both  senior 
to  ! ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿￿  but  are  considered  to  be  conflicting;  however, 
conflicting  semantics  is  obviously  limited  to  their  private 
permissions  rather  than  the  common  permissions  inherited  from 
! ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿￿.  Kuhn’s  strict  mutual  exclusion  semantics  necessitates 
partitioning  even  such  basic  roles  in  order  to  enforce  mutual 
exclusion  over  the  total  sets  of  permissions  associated  with  the 
two  roles.  However,  sometimes  in  such  a  scenario,  common 
permissions  may  create  information  flow  when  the  private 
permissions  of  the  two  roles  conflict.  In  Figure  3(a),  for  example, 
when  user  u1  activates  role  r1,  and  u2  activates  role  r2  at  the  same 
time,  they  can  exchange  information  contained  in  O1i  and  O2j  to 
each  other.    ACT-SoD3  prevents  such  possibilities. 
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Figure  3.  Session  time  SoD  examples   
ACT-SoD1  can  be  used  in  cases  where  a  user  needs  to  be  restricted 
from  acquiring  permissions  that  give  him/her  enough  power  to 
carry  out  some  activities.  For  example,  Figure  3(b)  shows  two 
roles  that  contain  permissions  for  the  subtasks  of  a  bigger  task.  If 
we  want  that  the  same  user  do  not  carry  out  the  two  subtasks,  then 
we  can  employ  ACT-SoD1  constraint.  Furthermore,  the  roles  may 
be  organized  as  an  A-hierarchy,  where  role  r  represents  the  actual 
task  role  and  is  the  senior  of  roles  r1  and  r2  that  represent  sub-
tasks  1  and  2.  If  users  from  U  are  assigned  to  r  and  the  ACT-SoD1 
is  defined  with  respect  to  R  =  {r1,  r2},  then  the  task  can  only  be 
performed  by  two  different  users  of  U  working  at  the  same  time. 
ACT-SoD2  can  be  used  to  enforce  the  requirement  that  a  particular 
task  can  be  performed  by  only  one  person  at  a  time  by  assuming 
the  task  role.  ACT-SoD4  limits  the  access  capability  of  a  user  by 
not  allowing  the  conflicting  roles  to  be  active  in  a  single  user 
session.  Its  usefulness  comes  from  the  fact  that  a  session  in  RBAC 
system  is  semantically  the  same  as  a  subject  in  traditional  access 
control  models  (DAC,  MAC,  etc.)  [17].  Similarly,  ACT-SoD5 
prevents  a  user  from  simultaneously  acting  as  two  subjects. 
5.4  Possibilistic  Activation  Time  SoDs 
(predicates:  can_activate,  can_be_acquired) 
We  also  define  SoDs  based  on  the  can_activate  predicate,  as 
shown  in  Table  7.  CACT-SoD1  prevents  all  possible  activation  of 
conflicting  roles  by  users  in  U.    Note  that  the  purpose  of  UAS-
SoD1  is  essentially  to  prevent  activation  of  conflicting  roles  by  a 
user  by  not  allowing  explicit  assignments  to  conflicting  roles  in 
the  first  place.  For  example,  when  U  =  {u1,  u2}  and  R  =  {r1,  r2}, 
we  can  prevent  the  possibility  of  activation  of  both  the  roles  by  a 
user  by  explicitly  denying  assignments  to  conflicting  roles  by 
using  UAS-SoD1.  Let’s  assume  that  because  of  this  constraint  u1  is 
assigned  to  r1  but  not  r2.  Now,  assume  that  there  is  a  role  x  such 
that  x￿is  senior￿￿ ￿￿r2  with  respect  to  an  A-hierarchy,  i.e.  any  user 
assigned  to  x  can  also  activate  role  r2,  as  depicted  in  Figure  4(a). 
Now,  if  we  allow  the  assignment  of  u1  to  x,  the  purpose  of 
preventing  u1  from  activating  both  r1  and  r2  at  the  same  time  is  not 
fulfilled.  This  is  because,  the  A-hierarchy  between  s  and  r2  makes 
the  predicate  can_activate(u1,  r2,  t)  true  [13],  hence  allowing 
u1  to  activate  r2  even  when  u1  is  already  assigned  to  r1.  Therefore, 
when  we  have  role  hierarchies,  implicit  assignment  may  be 
possible  through  the  use  of  can_activate(u,  r,  t)  predicate 
(we  refer  to  [13]  for  more  details),  which  may  make  it  possible  for 
a  user  to  activate  conflicting  roles  even  if  the  constraint  UAS-
SoD1  is  already  employed.  CACT-SoD1  prevents  such  scenarios, 
i.e.  it  prevents  both  implicit  and  explicit  assignments  of  a  user  to 
 
Table  7.  Possibilistic  role  activation  SoDs 
Possibilistic  Activation  (can_activate)  SoDs 
Type  SoD 
Semantics 
"u,  u1,  u2Î  U,  "r,  r1,  r2Î  R,  "t  Î  Sol(I,  P),    (u1¹  u2)    and    (r1¹  r2),  the  following  holds: 
(I,  P,  CACT-SoD1,  U,  R)  "uÎU,  SoD  Ù  can_activate(u,    r1,  t)  ®  Øcan_activate(u,    r2,  t) 
CACT-SoD1   
No  two  roles  in  R  can  be  activated  by  a  user  in  U  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P). 
(I,  P,  CACT-SoD1,  U,  R)  "u1,  u2ÎU,  SoD  Ù  can_activate(u1,    r1,  t)  ®  Øcan_activate(u2,    r2,  t) 
CACT-SoD2 
No  two  users  in  U  can  activate  two  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  CACT-SoD3,  U,  R)  SoD  «    CACT-SoD1    Ù    CACT-SoD2 
CACT-SoD3 
Users  in  U  can  activate  only  one  of  the  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P) 
(I,  P,  CACT-SoD4,  U,  R)  "uÎU,  SoD  Ù  can_activate(u,    r1,  s,  t)  ®  Øcan_activate(u,    r2,  s,  t) 
No  two  roles  in  R  can  be  activated  by  a  user  in  U  in  a  single  session  s  at  the  same  time  in  interval  (I,  P).  CACT-SoD4 
Users  in  U  can  activate  only  one  of  the  roles  in  R  in  a  single  session  s  at  the  same  time  n  interval  (I,  P) 
(a)  (b)        
conflicting  roles.  Furthermore,  CACT-SoD2  is  an  activation-time 
counterpart  of  UAS-SoD3,  and  CACT-SoD3  is  the  activation-time 
counterpart  of  UAS-SoD5.  CACT-SoD4  is  a  session  specific 
counterpart  of  CACT-SoD1.   
Note  that  one  way  to  prevent  the  scenarios  depicted  in  Figure  4(a) 
is  to  consider  that  r1  is  in  conflict  with  all  the  roles  hierarchically 
superior  to  r2,  as  in  [8,  14].  However,  this  approach  is  very 
restrictive,  and  makes  the  task  of  properly  designing  a  role 
hierarchy  very  difficult. 
5.5  Possibilistic  Permission  Acquisition  SoDs 
(predicates:  can_acquire,  can_be_acquired) 
Table  8  lists  the  possibilistic  permission  acquisition  SoDs.  CACQ-
SoD1  prevents  the  acquisition  of  permissions  through  the 
conflicting  roles  that  will  not  be  caught  by  PAS-SoD3,  similar  to 
the  way  CACT-SoD1  prevents  the  activation  of  conflicting  roles 
not  prevented  by  ACT-SoD1.  That  is,  constraint  CACQ-SoD1 
employs  the  “can  acquire”  semantics  and  hence  captures  both 
explicit  and  implicit  role-permission  assignments.  Note  that  PAS-
Table  8.  Possibilistic  permission  acquisition  SoDs 
Possibilistic  User-Permission  Acquisition  (can_be_acquired    and  can_acquire)  SoDs 
Type  SoD 
Semantics 
"u,  u1,  u2Î  U,  "r,  r1,  r2Î  R,  "p,  p1,  p2Î  P,  "t  Î  Sol(I,  P),  (u1¹  u2),  (r1¹  r2)  and  (p1¹  p2)  the  following  holds: 
(I,  P,  CACQ1,  U,  P,  R)  SoD  Ù  can_acquire(u2,    r1,  t)®  Øcan_acquire(u,  p,    r2,  t) 
CACQ_SoD1 
A  permission  in  P  cannot  be  acquired  by  a  user  in  U  through  different  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time   
(I,  P,  CACQ2,  U,  P,  R)  "uÎU,  "p1,  p2ÎP,  SoD  Ù  can_acquire(u,  p1,    r1,  t)®  Øcan_acquire(u,  p2,    r2,  t)  CACQ_SoD2 
  No  two  permissions  in  P  can  be  acquired  by  a  user  in  U  through  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time   
(I,  P,  CACQ3,  U,  P,  R)  "u1,u2ÎU,"pÎP,  SoD  Ù  r_can_acquire(u1,p,  r1,t)®  Øcan_acquire(u2,p,  r2,t)  CACQ_SoD3 
No  two  users  in  U  can  acquire  a  permission  in  P  through  different  roles  at  the  same  time 
(I,  P,  CACQ4,  U,  P,  R)  "u1,u2ÎU,"p1,p2ÎP,  SoDÙr_can_acquire(u1,p1,  r1,t)®  Ør_can_acquire(u2,p2,  r2,t) 
CACQ_SoD4 
No  two  users  in  U  can  acquire  different  permissions  in  U  through  two  roles  at  the  same  time 
(I,  P,  CACQ5,  U,  P)  "p,  SoD  Ù  can_acquire  (  u1,p,t)  ®  Øcan_acquire  (  u2,  p,  t)  CACQ_SoD5 
No  two  users  in  C  can  acquire  a  permission  in  P  at  the  same  time.   
(I,  P,  CACQ6,  U,  P)  "p1,  p2ÎP,  SoD  Ù  can_acquire  (  u1,  p1,  t)  ®  Øcan_acquire  (  u2,  p2,  t)    CACQ_SoD6 
No  two  permissions  in  P  can  be  acquired  by  the  different  users  in  U  at  the  same  time   
(I,  P,  CACQ7,  U,  P,  R  )  "  pÎ  P,  "rÎ  R,  SoD  Ù  can_acquire  (u1,  p,  r,  t)  ®  Øacquires(u2,  p,  r,  t)  CACQ_SoD7 
A  permission  in  P  cannot  be  acquired  by  different  users  in  U  through  the  same  role  in  R  at  the  same  time.   
(I,  P,  CACQ8,  U,  P,  R)  "p1,  p2Î  P,  "rÎ  R,  SoD  Ù  can_acquire  (u1,  p1,  r,  t)  ®  Øacquires(u2,  p2,  r,  t)  CACQ_SoD8 
No  two  permissions  in  P  can  be  acquired  by  two  users  through  the  same  role  in  R  at  the  same  time.   
(I,  P,  CACQ9,  R,  P)  "rÎ  R,  SoD  Ù  can_be_acquired(p1,  r,  t)  ®  Øcan_be_acquired(p2,  r,  t)  CACQ_SoD9 
No  two  permissions  in  P  can  be  acquired  through  a  role  in  R  at  the  same  time. 
(I,  P,  CACQ10,  R,  P)  "r1,r2Î  R,  SoD  Ùcan_be_acquired(  p1,  r1,  t)  ®  Øcan_be_acquired(p2,  r2,  t)  CACQ_SoD10 
Different  permissions  in  P  cannot  be  acquired  through  different  roles  in  R  at  the  same  time. 
(I,  P,  CACQ11,  U,  P) 
"uÎ  U,  SoD  Ù  can_acquire(u,    p1,  t)  ®  Øcan_acquire  (u,    p2,  t) 
   
CACQ_SoD11 
A  user  in  U  cannot  acquire  different  permissions  in  P  at  the  same  time.   
(I,  P,  CACQ12,  U,  P) 
"u1,  u2Î  U,  SoD  Ù  can_acquire(u1,  p1,  t)  ®  Øcan_acquire  (u2,  p2,  t) 
   
CACQ_SoD12 
No  two  users  in  U  can  acquire  different  permissions  in  P  at  the  same  time.   
(I,  P,  CACQ13,  U,  P,  R)  "r  ÎR,  "u,  SoD  Ù  can_acquire  (u,    p1,  r,    t)  ®  Ø  can_acquire  (u,    p2,  r,    t)   
CACQ_SoD13 
Permissions  in  P  cannot  be  acquired  by  a  user  in  U  through  a  role  in  R  at  the  same  time. 
          
SoD3  can  prevent  the  acquisition  of  permissions  through  the 
conflicting  roles  by  a  user  by  restricting  explicit  role-permission 
assignment.  However,  permission  acquisition  may  also  be  allowed 
through  the  implicit  role-permission  assignment  because  of  some 
hierarchical  relations.  For  example,  let  us  consider  P  =  {p1,  p2} 
and  R  =  {r1,  r2}.    Suppose,  we  have  the  SoD  constraint  PAS-
SoD3,  then  the  same  permission  in  P  cannot  be  assigned  to  the 
two  roles.  Provided  there  are  no  hierarchies  in  the  system,  the 
effect  (and  hence  the  purpose)  of  this  SoD  constraint  is  that  the 
same  permission  is  not  acquired  through  two  roles  even  if  a  user 
is  allowed  to  activate  them  both.  Now,  assume  there  is  a  role  x 
such  that  r2  is  senior  of  x  with  respect  to  an  I-hierarchy,  as  shown 
in  Figure  4(b).  Suppose  we  allow  the  assignment  of  p1  to  x. 
Furthermore,  suppose  we  have  the  following  assignment:    p1  is 
assigned  to  r1,  and  hence  p1  is  not  assigned  to  r2  by  virtue  of  the 
constraint  PAS-SoD2.    But,  as  p1  is  also  assigned  to  x,  and  (r2³
tx), 
p1  is  also  implicitly  assigned  to  r2,  the  SoD  constraint  PAS-SoD2 
does  not  prevent  p1 being  acquired  through  role  r2  using  hierarchy 
semantics.  CACQ-SoD1  prevents  such  permission-acquisitions 
through  implicit  assignments.  CACQ-SoD2  is  to  CACQ-SoD1  the 
way  UAS-SoD3  was  to  UAS-SoD1. 
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Figure  4.  Implication  of  SoDs  in  presence  of  hierarchy 
CACQ-SoD3  allows  acquisition  of  permissions  in  R  by  users 
through  only  one  of  the  conflicting  roles,  whereas  CACQ-SoD4 
does  not  allow  different  users  to  acquire  different  permissions 
through  the  conflicting  roles.  Similar  to  the  CACQ-SoD1 
constraint,  CACQ-SoD5  prevents  acquisition  of  permissions  that  is 
allowed  by  both  explicit  and  implicit  assignments.  As  depicted  in 
the  table  of  Figure  4,  CACQ-SoD5  prevents  conflicting  users  from 
acquiring  a  permission  of  P  through  the  same  role,  as  in  (a),  or 
though  different  roles,  as  in  (b).  CACQ-SoD6,  on  the  other  hand 
does  not  allow  two  separate  permissions  to  be  acquired  by 
conflicting  users  neither  through  the  same  role  (as  in  (c))  nor  the 
different  roles  (as  in  (d)).  CACQ-SoD7  prevents  conflicting  users 
from  acquiring  a  permission  in  P  through  the  same  role  in  R  at  the 
same  time  and  hence  does  not  allow  case  (a).  Similarly,  the  table 
in  Figure  5  shows  the  cases  depicted  in  Figure  5  that  are  not 
allowed  by  CACQ-SoD8,  CACQ-SoD3  and  User-SoD4.  Various 
combinations  of  these  SoDs  define  the  SoDs  from  CACQ-SoD7  to 
CACQ-SoD13. 
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CACQ-SoD4  (iv)  CACQ-SoD11  (ii),  (vii) 
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CACQ-SoD6  (vi)  CACQ-SoD13  (vii) 
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Figure  4.  Implication  of  SoDs  in  presence  of  hierarchy   
5.6  Comparison  with  other  SoDs 
Table  9  shows  the  correspondence  between  the  major  SoDs 
identified  in  the  literature  and  the  ones  proposed  here.  First,  we 
note  that  our  SoDs  take  into  account  time  that  has  not  been 
considered  earlier.  Secondly,  we  can  express  all  the  SoDs  in  [1] 
with  our  constraint  expressions  or  their  combinations.  The  table 
also  shows  how  our  SoDs  correspond  to  those  proposed  in  [18]. 
We  note  that  the  SoDs  in  rows  10  through  15  are  more  task 
oriented.  However,  with  the  help  of  the  triggers  and  dependency 
constraint  along  with  some  transformation  of  the  problem  to  map 
into  RBAC  domain,  our  framework  can  easily  express  them.  Since 
previously  identified  SoDs  are  non-temporal,  they  correspond  to 
the  special  case  of  the  time-constrained  SoDs  proposed  here, 
where  (I,  P)  =  all  and  any  occurrence  of  U,  R  or  P  in  GTRBAC 
SoDs  refer  to  the  complete  sets  Users,  Roles  and 
Permissions.  Furthermore,  by  using  the  GTRBAC  status 
predicates,  several  new  SoDs  have  been  identified. 
6.  RELATED  WORK 
Mainly  two  kinds  of  cardinality  constraints  are  often  mentioned  in 
the  literature  -  user  cardinality  and  role  cardinality  [6,  9,  15]. 
However,  our  approach  of  using  status  predicate,  an  evaluation 
function  and  a  projection  operator  to  define  cardinality  constraints 
allows  one  to  express  cardinality  constraints  associated  with  all 
states  -  role  enabling,  user  or  permission  assignment  as  well  as 
activation  time  including  session.        
Several  papers  in  the  literature  deal  with  separation  of  duty 
constraints,  with  efforts  focused  on  identifying  various  forms  of 
SoDs  as  well  as  to  categorize  them  [1,  8,  14,  18].  Simon  and 
Zurko  [18]  discuss  informally  a  wide  variety  of  SoD  constraints 
that  are  required  in  systems.  Gligor  et.  al.  [8]  provide  a  formalism 
for  these  SoDs.    One  limitation  of  this  work,  however,  is  that  it 
does  not  consider  the  session-based  dynamic  SoD  needed  for 
simulating  lattice-based  access  control  and  Chinese  Walls  in 
RBAC  [15,  17].  Another  limitation  is  that  the  SoDs  defined  do 
not  capture  the  hierarchical  semantics.  Improvements  along  these 
lines  can  be  seen  in  the  SoDs  listed  by  Ahn  et.  al.  [1].  Unlike 
these  approaches,  we  follow  a  predicate-based  definition  of 
general  exclusion  and  inclusion  of  various  kinds  of  assignments 
and  activations  to  define  the  SoD  properties  in  GTRBAC.  This 
approach,  while  subsumes  the  SoDs  defined  in  the  above-
mentioned  literature,  also  provides  the  overall  capability  of  an 
RBAC  model  to  capture  the  separation  of  duty  constraints  that 
may  exist. 
Dependency  constraints  form  a  less  explored  aspect  in  RBAC. 
While  some  form  of  dependency  is  implied  by  role  triggers 
introduced  in  TRBAC  [4]  and  GTRBAC  [12],  the  control  flow 
dependency  constraints,  where  a  strict  dependencies  are  implied, 
have  not  been  included  within  an  RBAC  framework.  Such  control 
flow  dependencies  are  typically  used  in  workflow  type  of  systems 
to  define  inter-dependencies  between  workflow  tasks  [3].  We 
believe  that  using  such  dependency  constraints,  GTRBAC  can 
better  handle  access  control  requirements  in  time-sensitive, 
workflow  types  of  applications,  by  providing  a  much  broader 
framework  for  mapping  tasks  into  roles  and  using  these 
constraints  to  capture  the  interdependencies  between  the  tasks. 
No  earlier  work  has  addressed  the  issue  of  time-based  cardinality, 
SoD  and  dependency  constraints.  Applying  periodicity/duration 
Table  9.  Comparison  with  SoDs  proposed  elsewhere 
SH:  Simon-Zurko’s  SoD  list  [18];  AH:  Ahn’s  SoDs  list  [1].  GTRBAC    (non-temporal  forms) 
SZ  Strong  SSoD  (no  user  can  be  assigned  to  conflicting  roles)    UAS-SoD1 
1 
AH 
SSoD-CR  (no  user  should  be  (implicitly  and  explicitly)  assigned  to  conflicting  roles,  i.e.,  no  user 
can-activate  conflicting  roles)   
CACT-SoD1   
2  AH  SSoD-CP  (a  user  cannot  acquire  conflicting  permissions)  CACTs-SoD9   
3  AH  Variation  of  2  (2  +  conflicting  permissions  cannot  be  acquired  through  a  role)    CACTs-SoD9   Ù  CACQ-SoD4.1 
4  AH  Variation  of  1  (1  +  conflicting  permissions  cannot  be  acquired  through  a  role  +  conflicting 
permissions  cannot  be  assigned  to  a  role 
CACT-SoD1  Ù  CACQ-SoD13 Ù  PAS-SoD2 
5  AH  SSoD-CU  (1`  +  conflicting  users  cannot  be  assigned  to  a  role)  CACT-SoD1  Ù  CACQ-SoD1  Ù  UAS-SoD2 
6  AH  Variation:  (4)  Ù Ù Ù Ù  (5)  (4)  Ù Ù Ù Ù  (5)  above 
SZ  Simple  DSoD   
7 
AH  User-based  DSoD  (Conflicting  roles  cannot  be  active  at  the  same  time  for  a  user) 
ACT-SoD1   
8  AH 
User-based  DSoD  with  CU  (Conflicting  roles  cannot  be  active  at  the  same  time  for  a  user)  only 
difference  between  this  and  (7)  is  that  here  we  are  taking  a  conflicting  user  set  other  wise  it  is  the 
same   
Same  as  7  but  U  is  also  a  conflicting  set 
9  AH  Session-based  DSoD  (Conflicting  roles  cannot  be  active  at  the  same  in  the  same  user  session)  ACT-SoD4 
10  AH 
Session-based  DSoD  with  CR  (Conflicting  roles  cannot  be  active  at  the  same  in  the  same  user 
session)  Only  difference  from  9  is  that  it  has  conflicting  set  of  users 
Same  as  9  but  R  is  also  a  conflicting  set 
11  SZ 
Object-based  DSoD  (no  user  may  act  upon  a  target  that  that  user  has  previously  acted  upon)      Can  be  rephrased  as:  if  a  user  acquires  a 
permission  then  he  cannot  acquire  it  again.  Post-
condition  constraint  can  be  used  here. 
12  SZ 
Operational  DSoD  (no  user  may  assume  a  set  of  roles  that  have  capability  for  a  complete  business 
job)   
Task  oriented:  if  the  task  can  be  represented  by 
atleast  two  roles  (sub-tasks)  then  it  can  be  easily 
represented  using  UAS-SoD1  or  ACT-SoD1 
13  SZ  History-based  DSoD  (no  user  is  allowed  to  perform  all  the  actions  in  a  business  task  in  the  same 
target  or  collection  of  targets) 
Comment  similar  to  12  can  be  made  here,  too.   
14  SZ  Order-dependent  SoD  (The  roles  must  perform  their  actions  in  a  particular  order)    It  can  be  expressed  as  a  sequence  of  precedence 
constraints   
15  SZ 
Order-independent  SoD  (Order  does  not  matter  as  long  as  both  happen)    Triggers  x®y  after  ￿t  ,  y®  x    after  ￿t  can  be 
used  to  enforce  this.        
constraints  for  these  SoDs  is  more  suitable  for  supporting  access 
control  needs  of  dynamically  evolving  systems  that  are  prevalent 
today. 
7.  CONCLUSION  AND  FUTURE  WORK 
We  have  presented  constraints  for  GTRBAC  model  including 
cardinality  constraints,  control  flow  dependency  constraints,  and 
separation  of  duty  constraints.  We  used  an  evaluation  function 
and  a  projection  operator  associated  with  a  set  of  GTRBAC  status 
predicates  to  build  an  elaborate  framework  for  expressing 
cardinality  constraints.  GTRBAC’s  trigger  has  been  extended  so 
that  more  complex  time-based  past  information  can  be  captured. 
A  set  of  control  flow  dependency  constraints  have  been 
introduced  using  the  trigger  framework  to  enforce  much  stricter 
dependency  constraints  than  those  that  can  be  expressed  using 
triggers.  We  also  showed  that  by  generalizing  to  system  events 
and  conditions,  the  triggers  and  CFD  framework  provides  an 
elaborate  model  for  capturing  context-based  access  requirements. 
Our  approach  to  separation  of  duty  constraints  is  based  on  the  fact 
that  the  notion  of  conflict  between  elements  in  a  set  is  often 
associated  with  another  set.  This  allows  us  to  consider  SoDs  that 
are  of  much  finer-granularity.  We  have  shown  that  the  separation 
duty  constraints  identified  in  the  literature  can  be  easily  expressed 
by  a  subset  of  our  separation  duty  constraint  expressions.  One  key 
future  work  that  we  plan  to  pursue  is  to  develop  a  SQL  or  XML 
like  language  to  specify  the  GTRBAC  constraints.    Another 
direction  we  plan  to  investigate  is  to  use  GTRBAC  for  workflow 
type  of  systems. 
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